Discussion of Local Investors' Preferences and Capital Structure

by

Vidhan K. Goyal HKUST July 13, 2017

What is This Paper About?

Local Age and Sex Composition Index (Local ASC Index)



Local Investor's Risk Preferences



Local Capital Supply
Conditions
(Amount and
Stability of Capital)

High ASC Index →
Higher average age and
higher women/men ratio



Local Banks Increase Lending (Quantity ↑ and Price ↓).




Matters more for firms that rely on bank debt.

D/V ratio of firms HQ in that county

Mechanism

- Local investor preferences matter for capital structure of firms.
- High ASC Index implies:
 - More cash and bank deposits with local banks.
 - Bank deposits are more stable.
- Banks lend locally.
- In High ASC index counties, loan supply shifts outwards. Supply is more stable.
- Firms borrow more and it is easier to refinance debt.
- Leverage goes up.

Implications of Shift in Supply




Quantity

Quantity Increases. Price Decreases (?)

Comments

- Alternative Prediction
 - Home bias: local investors buy equities of local firms.
 - Firms with less risky technology locate in areas with high ASC index.
 - To cater to local populations' risk preferences.
 - Firms with less risky technology have higher leverage.
- Could we rule out demand side explanations completely?
- Headquarter location is a choice variable.
 - Firms may not change headquarters but initial choice is endogenous.

Comments



Quantity

Identification Strategy: Interstate Banking Deregulation

- Removal of restrictions on bank entry and expansion
 - Facilitated M&A, promoted competition, and increased bank efficiency.
 - This helped local economic growth.
 - Jayaratne and Strahan (1997) find that the relaxing of restrictions on bank expansion led to greater bank efficiency
 - But no increase in credit supply.
 - Banking deregulation could be induced by an expectation of future growth paths.

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|----------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| Local ASC Index | 0.005*** | | | 0.004*** | | |
| | (5.34) | | | (4.48) | | |
| High ASC | (3.34) | 0.015*** | 0.028*** | (4.40) | 0.015*** | 0.023*** |
| | | (3.16) | (5.01) | | (3.53) | (4.48) |
| Low ASC | | -0.011** | (3.52) | | -0.005 | () |
| | | (-2.38) | | | (-1.16) | |
| Log Income | -0.024*** | -0.021** | -0.014 | -0.016* | -0.014 | -0.008 |
| | (-2.59) | (-2.29) | (-1.34) | (-1.79) | (-1.58) | (-0.83) |
| Log Population | -0.005** | -0.006** | -0.006** | -0.006*** | -0.006*** | -0.006** |
| | (-2.21) | (-2.31) | (-2.15) | (-2.71) | (-2.94) | (-2.48) |
| Log Religious | 0.004 | 0.005 | -0.008 | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.012 |
| | (0.41) | (0.51) | (-0.75) | (-0.11) | (-0.09) | (-1.14) |
| Rural Urban Continuum | -0.003 | -0.003 | 0.001 | -0.004** | -0.004** | -0.001 |
| | (-1.39) | (-1.39) | (0.27) | (-1.98) | (-2.03) | (-0.49) |
| Size | 0.027*** | 0.027*** | 0.028*** | 0.026*** | 0.026*** | 0.027*** |
| | (21.87) | (21.83) | (19.42) | (23.32) | (23.28) | (19.83) |
| Market-to-Book | -0.044*** | -0.044*** | -0.043*** | -0.014*** | -0.014*** | -0.015** |
| | (-39.28) | (-39.31) | (-33.02) | (-12.83) | (-12.85) | (-11.74) |
| Profitability | -0.134*** | -0.134*** | -0.131*** | -0.160*** | -0.160*** | -0.162** |
| | (-21.26) | (-21.24) | (-17.74) | (-19.93) | (-19.93) | (-16.82) |
| Tangibility | 0.195*** | 0.195*** | 0.191*** | 0.206*** | 0.207*** | 0.213*** |
| | (16.40) | (16.40) | (14.00) | (18.51) | (18.54) | (16.13) |
| Stock Return | -0.033*** | -0.033*** | -0.033*** | -0.015*** | -0.015*** | -0.015** |
| | (-27.18) | (-27.16) | (-23.22) | (-13.72) | (-13.69) | (-11.27) |
| Stock Volatility | 0.319*** | 0.319*** | 0.322*** | 0.233*** | 0.232*** | 0.239*** |
| | (19.83) | (19.81) | (16.99) | (15.41) | (15.38) | (13.18) |
| Firm Age | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.000 | -0.001*** | -0.000*** | -0.001** |
| | (0.09) | (0.17) | (-0.67) | (-2.86) | (-2.77) | (-3.19) |
| Dividend Payer | -0.088*** | -0.088*** | -0.087*** | -0.069*** | -0.069*** | -0.067** |
| | (-19.36) | (-19.32) | (-16.65) | (-17.19) | (-17.16) | (-14.04) |
| R&D/Sales | -0.004*** | -0.004*** | -0.005*** | -0.005*** | -0.005*** | -0.006** |
| | (-4.26) | (-4.23) | (-4.43) | (-3.09) | (-3.07) | (-3.14) |
| Constant | 0.508*** | 0.502*** | 0.464*** | 0.362*** | 0.366*** | 0.236** |
| | (4.66) | (4.57) | (3.82) | (3.54) | (3.57) | (1.97) |
| Year and Ind Fixed Effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 81,267 | 81,267 | 54,573 | 81,290 | 81,290 | 54,587 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.317 | 0.317 | 0.321 | 0.213 | 0.213 | 0.218 |

Leverage Specifications

- Frank and Goyal (2009) show that industry median leverage is the most important factor in explaining leverage.
 - Sign on stock volatility (not a robust factor in Frank and Goyal (2009).
- Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) show that firm fixed effects are important.

Conclusions

- The paper is addressing an important question.
- Disentangling demand from supply effects would be important.
- Leverage specification.