Discussion of Going Abroad in a Risky World: Geographic Diversification, Institutional Frictions, and Corporate Leverage

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by

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What is This Paper About?

$$y_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_1 Diversification_{i,t} + \beta_2 HHI_{i,t} + \gamma X_{i,t} + \mu_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

Financial Leverage:

Geographic diversification

Book leverage

(GDP growth correlations weighted by sales)

Market leverage

Interactions:

- 1. Tax Rates
- 2. Political Risk

International diversification

- Greater resilience to regional shocks
- Stable cash flows
- Lower default probability
- Higher debt capacity and greater tax benefits

Firms borrow more.

Diversification Measure

$$Diversification_{i,t} = \sqrt{\sum_{p=1}^{N_{i,t}} \sum_{q=1}^{N_{i,t}} \omega_{p,t} \omega_{q,t} \sigma_{p,t} \sigma_{q,t}} - \sigma(\sum_{p=1}^{N_{i,t}} \omega_{p,t} r_{p,[t-9,t]}),$$

Alternative Measure:

Average Correlation Measure =
$$\sum_{p=1}^{N_{i,t}} \sum_{q=1}^{N_{i,t}} \omega_{p,t} \omega_{q,t} Corr_{[t-9,t]}(p,q),$$

Assumption: Sales weights are correlated with cash flow weights.

- Strategic transfer pricing?
- Correlated with tax rates and political risk.

Diversification and leverage: Results

	Blev	Blev	Blev	Mlev	Mlev	Mlev
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Diversification	1.98*	4.43***	4.47***	3.53***	3.84**	4.03**
	(1.19)	(1.58)	(1.63)	(1.13)	(1.61)	(1.64)
HHI		0.04***	0.03*		0.02	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.02)
Ln(sales)		0.02***	0.02***		0.03***	0.03***
		(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)
Tangible		0.14***	0.14^{***}		0.19***	0.19***
		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
CF		-0.16^{***}	-0.16^{***}		-0.22^{***}	-0.21***
		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)
$Vol\ GDP\ Growth$		-0.19	0.13		-1.33	-1.42
		(0.85)	(0.96)		(0.96)	(1.14)
Bus_HHI		-0.04***	-0.04***		-0.06***	-0.06***
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)

We need a standard set of controls. Specification is missing other important leverage factors such as Market/Book ratio and Industry Median Leverage.

Diversification and Leverage

$$y_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_1 Diversification_{i,t} + \beta_2 HHI_{i,t} + \gamma X_{i,t} + \mu_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

Omitted Variables:

- Firms determine both how much debt to issue and what countries to operate in.
- To show that geographic diversification increases debt capacity, we need exogenous variation in diversification.

How Much Do the Weights Matter?

Fixing sales exposure in year 1.

$$Diversification_{i,t} = \sqrt{\sum_{p=1}^{N_{i,1}} \sum_{q=1}^{N_{i,1}} \omega_{p,1} \omega_{q,1} \sigma_{p,t} \sigma_{q,t}} - \sigma(\sum_{p=1}^{N_{i,1}} \omega_{p,1} r_{p,[t-9,t]})$$

Exogenous Variation in Weights

- Impute firm sales using its initial destination country sales.
- Impute firm sales using its initial destination country and industry sales in those countries.

Concern: Factors that drive growth of US sales in other countries (or for country-industry combinations) also drive leverage decisions.

How Much Do the Weights Matter?

If only the GDP growth correlations matter, then we should get similar results if we use:

- Random weights
- Equal weights
- Reverse weights

Effect of Taxes and Political Risk

- Tax rate differences and political risk consideration affect decisions about which countries to operate in.
- For example:
 - Highly profitable firms operate in low-tax countries. These countries are also more integrated.
 - And, empirically, we know that highly profitable firms have less leverage.
- Political risk differences could similarly affect diversification decision and also leverage.

Understanding what drives geographic diversification is important.

Comments: Table 8

$$Diversification_{i,t} = \sqrt{\sum_{p=1}^{N_{i,1}} \sum_{q=1}^{N_{i,1}} \omega_{p,1} \omega_{q,1} \sigma_{p,t} \sigma_{q,t}} - \sigma(\sum_{p=1}^{N_{i,1}} \omega_{p,1} r_{p,[t-9,t]})$$

	Year 1		
	Blev	Mlev	
	(1)	(2)	
Diversification	6.38***	5.34**	
	(2.36)	(2.37)	
HHI			
Ln(sales)	0.03***	0.03***	
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Tangible	0.12***	0.16***	
	(0.03)	(0.03)	
CF	-0.18***	-0.24***	
	(0.02)	(0.02)	
$Vol\;GDP\;Growth$	0.24	-1.00	
	(1.30)	(1.43)	
Bus_HHI	-0.04***	-0.07***	
	(0.01)	(0.01)	

Fixing sales exposure in year 1.

But, HHI could still be time varying.

Comments: Coefficient on Diversification

Table 3: Diversification and Leverage (N=24,840)

	Blev	Blev	Blev	Mlev	Mlev	Mlev
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Diversification	1.98* (1.19)	4.43*** (1.58)	4.47*** (1.63)	3.53*** (1.13)	3.84** (1.61)	4.03** (1.64)

Table 6: Diversification and Leverage: Institution Quality (N=24,840)

	Poli Risk		Poli Risk		Poli Risk	
	BLev	MLev	BLev	MLev	BLev	MLev
Diversification			0.008**	0.007**	0.012***	0.011***
$Diver \times Inst_qty$			(0.003)	(0.003)	$\frac{(0.004)}{0.004^{***}}$	$\frac{(0.004)}{0.003^{***}}$
2 000, 11,000=409					(0.001)	(0.001)
$Inst_qty$	0.007^{**}	0.005^{*}	0.006**	0.004	0.005^{**}	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)

Exporters versus MNC

- Identifying exporters
 - Foreign sales in Factset but no foreign income and foreign assets in Compustat.
 - Compustat coverage?
- What determines the decision to be an exporter versus MNC?

Conclusion

- Addresses important questions
 - Benefits and costs of global diversification
 - How much do global sales exposures affect financing decisions of firms?
- Well designed tests. Strong empirical support.
- To understand the effect of diversification on leverage, it will be important to:
 - Understand diversification motives.
 - Understand how firms adjust their exposures to various countries depending on tax rates and political risk considerations.